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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Dale E. Bennett*
CRIMINAL LAW
AGGRAVATED ARSON
Act 117 amends the aggravated arson article of the Criminal
Code' so as to cover more clearly all situations where the arson
endangers human life, whether it is by burning or explosion.
Foreseeable danger to human life is the gist of arson in its ag-
gravated form. A situation pointing up the need for clarifying
the definition of aggravated arson was presented by the inten-
tional burning of an unoccupied building which was located
within a few feet of an occupied residence. Here, there was
clear danger to human life, for the fire could easily spread to
the occupied residence. Similarly, arson by explosion in an un-
occupied building in a crowded downtown area could endanger
the lives of persons in adjoining buildings. However, difficulty
might have been encountered with the phrase "wherein it is
foreseeable that human life might be endangered." (Emphasis
added.) By substituting the word "whereby" for "wherein,"
the new aggravated arson definition clearly shows that danger
to human life is the aggravating element of the crime and that
the danger may be to occupants of adjoining buildings as well
as to people in the building burned or dynamited. Under the
new definition it will clearly be aggravated arson to intention-
ally burn or dynamite a warehouse in a crowded district of a
city.
CRIMINAL TRESPASS
The desire of many local communities for a definition of
criminal trespass which will meet the peculiar needs and con-
ditions of its agrarian economy has resulted in numerous amend-
ments of the criminal trespass article of the Criminal Code,2 and
a series of special criminal trespass provisions. Act 497 of 1964
again amends the general criminal trespass article, with special
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. R.S. 14:51 (Supp. 1964).
2. Id. 14:63.
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
provisions for Assumption Parish. Act 435 provides a spe-
cial criminal trespass offense for Bossier Parish.3 The need for
different criminal trespass rules in certain areas is acknowl-
edged, but the problem is being badly confused by a series of
parish-by-parish amendments or special trespass laws. A true
solution will require a careful joint consideration of trespass
problems by interested parties from various sections of the state,
and then a study of what other states are doing.
ABORTION
The crime of abortion, as defined in article 87 of the Crim-
inal Code 4 had required that the drug be administered or the
instrument used upon "a pregnant female" for the purpose of
procuring a miscarriage. If the defendant intended to procure
a miscarriage, but the female was not actually pregnant (or the
state failed to prove the female's pregnancy beyond a reason-
able doubt), the crime of abortion was not established; but the
defendant could be convicted of an attempted abortion. Under
the general attempt article of the Criminal Code 5 an attempt is
committed when the defendant has a specific intent to commit
a crime and does an act tending directly toward the accomplish-
ing of his object. The definition paragraph of this article con-
cludes, "it shall be immaterial whether under the circumstances,
he would have actually accomplished his purpose."
Under amended article 87, the would-be abortionist is guilty
even though it turns out that the female was not actually preg-
nant. The specific intent to cause a miscarriage is the gist of
the offense. The extended definition of abortion may have been
dictated by a desire to impose criminal liability for the basic
crime upon one who attempts the offense. (This is not unusual:
public bribery, for example, is defined to include "giving or
offering to give" a bribe. 6) If it is posited upon a fear that an
attempt to commit an abortion upon a non-pregnant female is
unprovided for, the fear does not seem well founded in view of
the broad language of the general attempt article of the Crim-
inal Code. That situation would be analogous to attempted
theft by the picking of an empty pocket or reaching into an
empty cash drawer. It is significant that the definition of abor-
3. Id. 14:63.6.
4. Id. 14:87.
5. Id. 14:27.
6. Id. 14:118.
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tion in the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code7 follows
the ;same pattern as the original article 87 of the Louisiana
Criminal Code in requiring that the defendant shall "terminate
the pregnancy" of the woman.
SPECIAL FRAUD CRIMES
A number of special fraud crimes, reminiscent of the pre-
criminal code days when there was a special theft law to cover
each of the various forms and types of stealing, provided for
credit card theft," wrongfully removing a building or structure
from mortgaged immovable property," and renting a motor
vehicle for fraudulent pretenses. 10
* The credit card theft law adds nothing but elaboration to
the general theft article of the Criminal Code" and the recent-
ly amended definition of "anything of value" which now in-
cludes any "service available for hire.' 2 Unauthorized use of a
credit card, or use of a revoked, forged, or expired credit card
or number, as well as the various other devices spelled out by
act 192, would constitute obtaining "by means of fraudulent
conduct, practices or representations" under the theft article,
and the obtaining of "credit or the privilege of making a de-
ferred payment" will always be incidental to the obtaining of
goods or services. The credit card theft law may serve a use-
ful purpose in states without a general theft law, and the mag-
nitude of the evil may justify special treatment in Louisiana.
However, the legislature should carefully evaluate such special
laws, lest we re-embark on the old merry-go-round of a separ-
ate crime for each kind of thievery.
The crime of removal of a building, structure, or some at-
tached part, from mortgaged immovable property covers a spe-
cialized type of fraud which might not be clearly covered by
the general theft article. The requirement of intent to defraud
is most important here, for removals which are not intended to
defeat or materially diminish the mortgagee's security should
not be criminal.
H The fraudulent renting or retention of motor vehicles act
7. ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
8. La. Acts 1964, No. 192, LA. R.S. 14:218 (Supp. 1964).
9. La. Acts 1964, No. 496, LA. R.S. 14:219 (Supp. 1964).
10. La. Acts 1964, No. 442, LA. R.S. 14:220 (Supp. 1964).
11. Id. 14:67.
12. Amended by La. Acts 1964, No. 68.
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covers criminal conduct that was already adequately provided
for. The fraudulent renting or otherwise obtaining of a motor
vehicle would constitute unauthorized use of movables under
article 68 of the Criminal Code,'3 which embraces obtaining "by
means of fraudulent conduct, practices or representations." The
wrongful refusal to return the property, whether it constituted
a misappropriation or a taking, would constitute theft if it was
with an intent to deprive permanently; otherwise, it would con-
stitute unauthorized use. The special defense to civil actions
arising out of the arrest or detention of violators of this law
may create some nice problems. It would appear indirectly to
extend the officer's right of arrest without a warrant to misde-
meanors not committed in the officer's presence. A further
query- would it permit arrests by private persons ?14
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
DISPOSITION OF SEIZED PROPERTY
Act 5,1 providing for the disposition of property seized in
connection with criminal proceedings, supplies a serious defi-
ciency in the present law. It covers all types of property seized,
either under a search warrant or incidental to an arrest, except
as otherwise specifically provided by law. Without any compre-
hensive statute on the subject, clerks of court, as custodians of
seized property, have been without statutory guidance as to the
proper method of disposing of seized property after it was no
longer needed as evidence. As a result, much seized property
accumulated in storerooms; and many owners of non-contra-
band property were required to go through a long, arduous pro-
cedure to obtain possession of their property. The new statute
provides a procedure for expeditious disposal of contraband
property and for the prompt and safe return of harmless prop-
erty to its rightful owner.
BAIL PROCEDURES
Act 220 increases from sixty days to six months the period
13. LA. R.S. 14:68 (1950).
14. Generally, private persons have no authority to arrest for misdemeanors.
see id. 15:61.
1. LA. R.S. 15:48.1 (Supp. 1964).
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within which a judgment of forfeiture of an appearance bond
may be set aside upon the surrender or appearance of the de-
fendant for trial, or upon proof that the defendant's non-ap-
pearance was due to physical disability, detention in jail, or
service in the armed forces of the United States. 2 While it is
appropriate, under the specified circumstances, to relieve from
the hardship of a judgment of forfeiture of an appearance
bond, the extension of the period to six months after rendition
of the judgment is very generous.3 In extending the discharge
period the new statute should have required the defendant and
his surety to pay the costs and expenses of the defendant's fail-
ure to appear, such as the costs incurred in the forfeiture pro-
ceedings, and the costs of returning the defendant for trial,
which will sometimes require extradition. 4 The surety is given
liberal relief from the judgment of forfeiture, and it is reason-
able that he should reimburse the parish for all costs and ex-
penses resulting from the defendant's breach of the bail under-
taking as a minimal liability resulting from the default. A spe-
cial problem will be presented by the discharge of forfeitures of
cash bonds, especially small bonds of one hundred dollars or
less which may be furnished by misdemeanants. The return of
these bonds, after a six-month period, may give rise to some
practical difficulties.
GRAND AND PETIT JURIES
In Collins v. Walker 5 the jury commission had attempted to
include an ample number of Negroes on the grand jury which
indicted a Negro defendant, and had purposely included six (of
twenty) Negro names on the grand jury list from which the
grand jury was drawn. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that the purposeful placing of six Negro
names on the grand jury list was a violation of the "equal pro-
tection" formula announced in Cassel v. Texas,6 that "the basis
of selection cannot consciously take color into account." The
Collins decision posed a serious practical problem for judges
and jury commissions. How can the commission assure adequate
2. Amending LA. R.S. 15:108B, 15:109 and 15:110 (1950).
3. A commentary to § 106 of the American Law Institute Code of Criminal
Procedure shows a wide variety of periods for remission of bail bond forfeitures as
follows: Iowa (60 days), New Jersey (4 years), New York (1 year), Oklahoma
(the term of court), and Washington (60 days). The 1963 Illinois Code of Crim-
inal Procedure, § 110-8(g) provides a thirty-day period.
4. See ALI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 107 (1930).
5. 329 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1964), aff'd on rehearing, with dissent, 335 F.2d
417.
6. 339 U.S. 282 (1950).
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representation of the colored race without some conscious effort
to do so? Act 161 seeks to help with this jury selection enigma
by changing the method of selection of the grand jury list.7 The
prior law, in order to secure an able group of prospective grand
jurors representing all portions of the parish, had provided that
the grand jury list of twenty names should be selected from the
general jury venire. The new law provides that the names
should be drawn "indiscriminately and by lot" from the general
venire list. It further stipulates, out of an abundance of caution,
that the names so drawn are to be written or typewritten on
slips of paper, "with no designation as to race or color." Both
the old and the new law provide that name slips shall be placed
in an envelope, from which the grand jury will ultimately. be
drawn.8
The 1964 amendment, by providing for drawing, rather than
selection, of the twenty names for the grand jury list, will prob-
ably forestall further problems involving conscious inclusion or
exclusion of Negroes from grand jury lists.9 Unfortunately a
heavy price is paid, for the jury commisssion is now deprived
of an opportunity to select capable jurors from all parts of the
parish for the important grand jury list. However, it is much
easier to criticize a present solution than to propose a better one,
and much careful thought has been given to this problem.
The procedure for supplementing the Orleans Parish general
jury venire of "not less than seven hundred and fifty persons"
was amended by act 515.10 With a weather eye directed toward
the Cassel and Collins holdings, the new law requires that this
list be supplemented quarterly "from a list to be furnished by
the Registrar of Voters .... which list shall contain the names
of persons added to or deleted from the voter registration rolls
. . . during the preceding quarter."
INSANITY PROCEDURES
Act 472 amends the insanity procedures of the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure by adding a number of provisions aimed at avoid-
ing improper commitment or continued commitment to mental
institutions of persons charged with offenses."
7. LA. R.S. 15:180 (Supp. 1964).
8. LA. R.S. 15:184 (1950) provides for the selection of the foreman and the
drawing of the grand jury.
9. In an addendum to a very thorough and logical dissent to the opinion on
a second rehearing in Collins, Judge Dawkins calls attention to Act 161 of 1964
and suggests that it "clearly cures" the problem raised by the Collins decision.
10. Amending LA. R.S. 15:194 (1950).
11. It adds a new LA. R.S. 15:271 (Supp. 1964).
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Paragraph A provides that no person charged with an of-
fense shall be committed to a mental institution for observation
or detention on the ground of insanity or mental defect unless
he was represented by counsel at the hearing or trial where his
mental condition was determined. This provision is phrased in
a somewhat confused manner, but it will probably get the job
done. It goes further than the general Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure rule providing for the assignment of counsel in felony
cases, 1 2 and provides that a person charged with a misdemeanor
must have counsel when his sanity or mental capacity is in issue.
This is particularly important in protecting petty offenders
from unnecessary commitments to mental institutions. Such
persons are, by the very nature of their condition, unable to de-
termine the need for counsel?' s
Paragraph B seeks to help the "forgotten man" of the mental
hospital, by requiring that the patients in the security ward of
the mental hospital shall be examined at least once a year by
the medical staff to determine whether the patient is capable
of standing trial, or should be transferred to another ward for
a different type of treatment. Of course, the medical staff's de-
termination that a committed defendant is capable of standing
trial will merely constitute a recommendation, and the ultimate
determination of the defendant's mental capacity to proceed
will be determined by the court in a contradictory hearing held
pursuant to article 267 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 4
This hearing will be conducted like the original sanity hearing.
Prior to that hearing the court may order an examination by a
sanity commission, or it may rely upon the report of the super-
intendent or staff psychiatrist of the mental institution. If the
court determines that the defendant has the mental capacity to
proceed, the criminal proceedings should be promptly resumed.
Paragraph C of new article 271 provides that all releases from
the mental institution, whether of a temporary or permanent
nature, must be by order of court.
It is not clear as to how far this provision will supersede the
clearly stated and practical discharge provisions of the Mental
Health Law.15
12. LA. R.S. 15:143 (1950).
13. Accord, LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
REVISION tit. XXI -Insanity Proceedings art. 3 (Expos4 des motifs no. 19,
March 8, 1963).
14. LA. R.S. 15:267 (1950).
15. Id. 28:96-97.
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